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ABSTRACT
The monopoly provided when trademark protection is given to a religious name is in direct tension
with an individual’s right to freedom of religion. One’s ability to freely use a particular religious
name in spiritual practice, and to identify one’s belief system with the words that commonly describe
it, are weakened when trademark law designates just one owner. This Article explores the impact of
the impending issuance of brand new top-level domains utilizing religious names, and how the
providing of an exclusive right for one entity to govern over a religious top-level domain, in addition
to the existence of a trademark monopoly held upon the same name, may affect the vigor of freedoms
of religion and speech. This Article argues that there should be a presumption against trademark
protection of religious names in order to reaffirm constitutional freedoms, and that the
implementation of such a presumption within U.S. law will have the additional benefit of improving
an imperfect judicial framework for analyzing trademark cases involving religious names. The
Article concludes by proposing some specific rules for implementation of such a presumption, as well
as some comparative remarks juxtaposing the solution proposed by this Article with public policy
objectives and the discourse within the international community.
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ALLOCATION OF NEW TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN NAMES AND THE EFFECT UPON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
N. CAMERON RUSSELL*
INTRODUCTION
This Article will examine the ability of religious institutions to claim exclusive
trademark rights in certain religious words, phrases and trade indicia. Specifically,
the Article will approach this issue by analyzing the recent announcement of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) that it has
accepted applications for new top-level domain (“TLD”) names—including religious
domains, such as <.catholic>, <.islam> and <.bible>—in order to expand beyond
<.com>, <.org> and the like.1 Although ICANN has not yet processed any of these
new TLD applications, thus assigning a TLD to a winning bidder, the mere prospect
of doing so has already fueled worldwide theological debate.2 Should one particular
entity be given the exclusive right to govern a TLD utilizing a religious name or
phrase? If so, what are the ramifications of granting the right of governance to one
title-holder?
Notwithstanding hortatory argument, the first results of the
applications are due to be released by ICANN in the summer of 2013, when legal
disputes will inevitably stem from the award of a religious TLD to one specific
entity.3
In fact, it seems that legal proceedings are especially likely within the United
States, where precedent in some courts recognizes no distinction between trademark
rights in religious names versus secular trade names alleged to exist in any other
commercial context, including when religious words and phrases are used within

* © N. Cameron Russell 2013. N. Cameron Russell, Esq., Teaching Fellow, Fordham
University School of Law. B.S.B.A., UNC-Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of
Law; LL.M., Fordham University School of Law. The author would like to thank Dr. Shlomit
Yanisky-Ravid for her supervision, comments and guidance on these contents, as well as Professor
Hugh C. Hansen for his cited contribution.
1 ICANN Approves Historic Change to Internet's Domain Name System—Board Votes to
Launch New Generic Top-Level Domains, ICANN (June 20, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/news/
announcements/announcement-20jun11-en.htm. For a full listing of applications received by
ICANN for new gTLDs as of June 13, 2012, see New gTLD Applied-For Strings, ICANN (June 13,
2012), http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/application-results/strings-1200utc-13jun12-en.
Also note that, for ease of reading, when specific TLDs or web addresses are referenced within the
text, each is denoted within right and left angle brackets.
2 Tom Heneghan, Religious Groups Vie for New Web Domain Names, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2012,
6:56PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/net-us-internet-religion-names-idUSBRE87U0L
320120831. “The Vatican’s application for exclusive use of .catholic drew criticism from members of
several Protestant churches who also use the term, which comes from the Greek for ‘universal.’” Id.
3 Id.; see also ICANN Increases Web Domain Suffixes, BBC NEWS (June 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13835997 (indicating that a portion of funding will be set
aside to “deal with potential legal actions raised, raised by parties who fail to get the domains they
want”).
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Internet domain names.4 If there is an allegation of cybersquatting,5 there is specific
redress within the Lanham Act,6 as well as an exclusive avenue for alternative
dispute resolution under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“UDRP”) administered through the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”).7 But absent a cybersquatting allegation, the analysis of one’s use of
religious trademarks in the domain name context is generally the same as in any
other trademark infringement action, so long as the challenged designation is used
within a website in some commercial sense.8 In short, religious names receive
traditional trademark protection, and the rules and the legal analysis for
determination of whether trademark rights exist do not change simply because
another’s use of an asserted trademark takes place ahead of <.com>, or before or
within any other TLD in a website address.9
Good faith uses of religious names in domain names, whether in sincere practice
of one’s religion or in genuine exercise of freedom of speech, will not fall under the
cybersquatting umbrella.10 Therefore, in these cases, courts will apply traditional
legal standards under the Lanham Act to claims of trademark infringement involving
religious trade names, which looks to (i) whether the plaintiff has a protectable
ownership interest in the mark, and (2) whether the defendant's use of the mark is
likely to cause consumer confusion.11 We should rethink the current legal framework
and how we apply the law to decide whether trademark rights exist in these religious
names.

4 See, e.g., Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 416 (6th Cir.
2010) (finding that a pastor’s use of the term “Seventh-day Adventist” in church name was likely to
cause confusion among the public); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 305 (D.N.J. 1998),
aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding trademark rights existed in “Jews for Jesus” and finding
against a critic of Jews for Jesus seeking registration of “jewsforjesus.org” and “jews-for-jesus.com.”);
Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 983–84 (4th Cir. 1944) (finding “Methodist Episcopal Church”
had exclusive rights to use the name).
5 Frequently Asked Questions: Internet Domain Names, WORLD. INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/faq/domains.html (last visited May 24, 2013) (defining
cybersquatting as “exploit[ing] the first-come, first-served nature of the domain name registration
system to register names of trademarks, famous people or businesses with which they have no
connection”).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
7 Domain Name Dispute Resolution, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
domains/ (last visited May 24, 2013).
8 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:76 (4th
ed. 2012) (explaining that the Lanham Act is triggered “[w]hen a domain name is used for a Web
site that advertises or offers for sale any goods or services”).
9 See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “the generic
term ‘hotels’ did not lose its generic character by placement in the domain name HOTELS.COM.”).
10 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 25:78 (“The good faith safe harbor was held broad enough to
accommodate a religious group that had a reasonable belief that it could use the name of a group
critical of its religion as the domain name of a web site mocking and rebutting the critic's Web
site.”); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1058–59
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that supporters of the Mormon Church who created a website with a
domain name the same as the name of an organization which was critical of the Mormon Church
was not an ACPA violation.).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
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This Article argues that, absent bad faith in the selection and use of a particular
religious name or phrase, such as in instances of domain name cybersquatting, there
should exist a strong, but rebuttable presumption that religious trade indicia are
excepted from trademark protection under U.S. intellectual property law. Rebuttal
of the presumption should require “clear and convincing” evidence in order to protect
the integrity of trademark protection at a fundamental level, while at the same time,
reaffirm a constitutional absolute to preserve free practice of religion for all, whether
big or small, and no matter how new or old a genuine religious belief may be. It
seems apparent that courts’ application of the traditional law of trademarks in the
context of religious names has not engendered bright-line, consistently-applied, rules
for protection and cannot be sustained moving forward.12 This Article posits that,
especially in the imminent post-TLD-expansion era, use of religious names within
Internet domain names aptly demonstrates why we should rethink how we apply the
law to these cases. In turn, a presumption that such religious words and phrases are
excepted from trademark protection is worthy of consideration by U.S. lawmakers
and jurists.
Part I of this Article examines the current state of trademark jurisprudence
from a practical and forward-looking standpoint through the impending scenario of
ICANN’s expansion into new TLD names, a move toward an almost limitless creation
of new “real estate” on the web.13 Providing one religious entity with an exclusive
broad-sweeping intellectual property right, in addition to its exclusive right to occupy
a particular area of cyberspace, would restrict every other bona fide user’s ability to
use the particular religious name or phrase in any other area of cyberspace, including
in other TLDs as they inevitably expand over time. 14 Therefore, the example of TLD
expansion aptly demonstrates why there should be a presumption against the
existence of a trademark monopoly over a religious name.
Part II considers the present judicial framework for adjudicating cases involving
trademarks and religious names, one which has been labeled an “intellectually
unsatisfactory” rubric and criticized by many legal scholars.15 The bases for such
criticism are generally two-fold. First, such religious words and phrases are largely
generic, and are merely basic descriptions of the particular religious “product” or
“service” being promoted.16 This Article argues that genericism becomes the
overwhelming likelihood if traditional trademark tests are properly and secularly
applied. Therefore, it should be presumed that religious trade indicia are incapable of
12 Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 416 (6th Cir. 2010)
(awarding trademark protection to “Seventh-day Adventist”); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First
Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1349 (N.J. 1987) (providing no trademark
protection to “Christian Science”).
13 ICANN Increases Web Domain Suffixes, supra note 3.
14 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(“Once a domain name is registered to one user, it may not be used by another.”).
15 See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien
Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 335–37 (1986).
16 Jed Michael Silversmith & Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth: The
Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467, 469 (2001) (“[M]ost religious organizations’ names consist of
generic words . . . .”); id. at 511 (providing that a religious trademark could be generic if it
“contain[s] words that are common words merely describing a set of beliefs”).

[12:697 2013]

Allocation of New Top-Level Domain Names
and the Effect Upon Religious Freedom

701

acquiring the requisite secondary meaning in order to receive protection as a
descriptive mark unless a party can demonstrate through “clear and convincing”
evidence that the religious name is, in fact, a single source identifier. Second,
notwithstanding whether religious names are capable of trademark protection in
theory, U.S. courts, reasonably, have incredible difficulty deciding matters involving
intellectual property rights and religious names because, absent clear bad faith,
another’s bona fide use of religious words or phrases is protected by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, both the genericism and
constitutional aspects of any legal analysis in these cases auger in favor of a per se
presumption against recognizing trademark rights in these religious names. These
religious names should not be monopolized by limited groups and should be
presumed available within the public domain for society’s use, whether to direct
Internet traffic to a specific area of cyberspace, to freely describe one’s religion, or for
purposes of criticism in the spirit of free speech.
Part III will briefly summarize the alternative means of dispute resolution
available outside of the courts, which become especially relevant subsequent to TLD
expansion, in the event of a dispute as to use of a religious name within a domain
name. As posited herein, parties will seek to find redress through a more-able and
more-efficient means of adjudication outside of the present inadequate court system
if one is available. I submit that one is not, and adoption and implementation of a
presumed exception for religious names from trademark protection within U.S.
courts will assist to bandage the only means of adjudication existing.
Finally, Part IV proposes the solution—a presumption against trademark
protection for religious names—by offering some clear rules of application, along with
some concluding remarks regarding the proposal’s congruence with public policy
objectives and international norms.
I. INFINITE EXPANSION OF TOP LEVEL DOMAINS WILL INEVITABLY REQUIRE CHANGE
WITHIN THE LAW
The current legal framework does not make practical sense moving forward with
respect to its application to domain names in Internet addresses. Currently, because
of the relatively limited number of TLDs, and the resulting limitation on lower-level
domain names within them, there is a corresponding limited ability to obtain
“infringing” domain names which utilize words and phrases protected by
trademark.17 Now, ICANN’s expansion into new TLD names signifies a step toward
an almost limitless creation of potential, perhaps likely, infringing names. 18 As
discussed above, because religious names receive trademark protection, including
within domain names, an exclusive intellectual property monopoly held by the
17 ICANN Increases Web Domain Suffixes, supra note 3 (“There are currently 22 gTLDs, as well
as about 250 country-level domain names such as .uk or .de.”).
18 Brad Newberg & Judy Harris, Understanding the Many Challenges Involved in Registering
New GTLDS, in NAVIGATING ICANN’S NEW RULES REGARDING GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN
NAMES: AN IMMEDIATE LOOK AT THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES THAT COME WITH THE NEW
GTLD PROGRAM 65 (Aspatore Special Report 2012).
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winning bidder for a new religious TLD, in addition to an exclusive right to occupy
and divvy space on the TLD, will leave no avenue for other bona fide uses of that
religious name or phrase on the Internet, even as TLDs continue to expand, and even
at the risk of constitutional freedoms.
A. ICANN’S Release of New Religious Top-Level Domains
Without evaluating whether an applicant has the right to a certain name,
ICANN has developed a complex administrative procedure, coined “Digital Archery,”
for how it will process applications for new TLDs when received.19 Once a TLD is
granted to a particular person, organization or entity, importantly, the award
includes an exclusive right to make a determination as to who receives the lowerlevel domain names within its newly-acquired TLD.20 It may “manage that domain
exclusively, renting out addresses that use its extension and rejecting bids it
considers unsuitable.”21
B. A Presumption Against Trademark Protection Comports with the Competition
Objectives Underlying Trademark Law
A primary objective of trademark law, and of intellectual property law as a
whole, is to generate and sustain an environment of robust competition. 22 On one
hand, trademark law allows for protection of “brands” so that a producer or service
provider can build a reputation that its product or service is better than another, and
consumers can reward producers for their hard work through purchase of products or
services sold under one’s particular mark. 23 However, trademark law draws distinct
boundaries where the providing of a monopoly on a particular word, phrase or other
designation thwarts inter-brand competition by placing competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage.24 Such limitation comports with a normative
“distributive justice” theory underlying intellectual property as a legal construct, as
well as international notions of basic human rights, to strike a balance between right
holders’ and users’ interests such that monopolies are not unconditionally perpetual.
In doing so, a basic right is preserved to share in the resources and societal

19 Heneghan, supra note 2. “’We don’t look into whether the Vatican has the right to the
.catholic name,’ [Akram] Atallah [interim head of ICANN] said. ‘Hopefully, the process will get to a
conclusion that is satisfying to the majority.’” Id. For a description of the “Digital Archery”
procedure, see How ICANN Will Process Applications If Many are Received, ICANN,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/tas/batching/basics (last visited May 24, 2013).
20 Heneghan, supra note 2.
21 Id.
22 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2 (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
23 Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012).
24 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
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advancement of the community and to participate in its cultural life.25 At its core,
trademark law’s emphasis on healthy competition preserves these basic
fundamentals.
Notwithstanding, the ability for religious voices to compete and culturally
participate is tested when an exclusive trademark monopoly is held by the winning
bidder for a new religious TLD. For instance, in the event that the American Bible
Society is awarded the <.bible> TLD for which it has applied, then without American
Bible Society approval, no matter how objectively provided or withheld, one will be
forbidden from occupying a web space on <.bible>.26 The American Bible Society will
make a subjective determination as to whether a certain group has a “healthy respect
for the Bible” sufficient to occupy space on the <.bible> TLD.27 Will the American
Bible Society approve of an organization affiliated with the Jehovah’s Witnesses?28
With Mormonism?29 With Islam?30 If not, then Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and
Muslims must seek an alternative virtual home, that is, another web address on an
alternate TLD, even if <.bible> becomes the renowned universal marketplace of ideas
as to the Bible. As a result, the American Bible Society would have unilaterally
restricted these groups from discourse in the mainstream.
Of course, the American Bible Society does not own trademark rights in the
word “bible.” However, in the event that an organization does possess a trademark
monopoly on a religious name, in addition to the same power of exclusivity held by
the American Bible Society for a certain TLD, where are minority groups to go on the
25 Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual
Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 858–59 (2007); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
26 See List of New gLTDs, supra note 1; New gTLD Application By American Bible Society,
NEWTLDS.COM, http://www.newtlds.com/applications/BIBLE (last visited May 24, 2013).
27 Who We Are, AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY,
http://www.americanbible.org/about/legal/
disclaimer (last visited May 24, 2013) (listing their mission statement as “mak[ing] the Bible
available to every person in a language and format each can understand and afford, so all people
may experience its life-changing message”). However, contrary to its all-inclusive mission
statement, American Bible Society spokesperson Geoffrey Morin has publicly stated that, with
regard to potential control of the <.bible> TLD, the American Bible Society would only share the
<.bible> domain “with individuals and groups who, regardless of faith, have a healthy respect for the
Bible.” Heneghan, supra note 2.
28 Are You Christians?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/
are-jehovahs-witnesses-christians/ (last visited May 24, 2013). Jehovah’s Witnesses believe in the
Bible and that they worship the one true religion. Id.; see also Do You Believe That You Have the
One True Religion, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/truereligion/ (last visited May 24, 2013).
29 Articles
of Faith, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
http://mormon.org/articles-of-faith (last visited May 24, 2013). Mormons believe that the Bible, “as
far as it is translated correctly,” is a companion volume of scripture to the Book of Mormon. Id.
Those of the Mormon faith likewise believe that they comprise “the only true and living church.” See
Dallin H. Oaks, The Only True And Living Church, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS (last updated Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.lds.org/youth/article/only-true-living-church?lang=
eng.
30 YASSER GABR & HOUDA KARKOUR, ISLAM IN BRIEF: A SIMPLIFIED INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM
24 (2008). Muslims believe that “Allah revealed Books to his Prophets and Messengers,” of which
were the “Scripture of the Prophet Abraham” and the “Psalms given to the Prophet David and the
Gospel, which was brought by the Prophet Jesus Christ.” Id.
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Internet when seeking to use the monopolized religious name in the genuine practice
of their religion? Thus, for fear of exclusion, news of disputes among various
religious groups shortly followed ICANN’s announcement, whether or not these
groups were actively vying for a particular TLD.31 When these restrictions on uses of
religious names are tested, which they are certain to be, the floodgates may pour
open with disputes before courts and arbiters that neither are equipped to resolve.
II. A PRESUMPTION MAY BUILD COGENCY WITHIN A PRESENT DAY “INTELLECTUALLY
UNSATISFACTORY” FRAMEWORK
Prior to discussing the specifics of U.S. legal doctrine at present, it is helpful to
first provide a context for how disputes as to religious names generally arise and
enter the court system. The “prototypical” religious trade name dispute has been
aptly described as follows:
The prototypical dispute occurs when a small group of parishioners breaks
away from its mother church. In doing so, they hope to use part of their
mother church’s name in the name of their new church. Out of a legitimate
concern of confusion, or perhaps out of spite, the members of the mother
church attempt to enjoin the breakaway church from using its name.32
In such cases, courts are faced with a difficult and delicate task. A trade name
is of course, like all intellectual property, a property right, and a property right
includes the right to exclude others.33 Disputes regarding church property are often
problematic, not only for courts that are faced with resolution of same, but also for
church parishioners who do not want the government intermeddling in autonomous
church dealings and, perhaps, excluding them from use of something which has been
determined to be “church property.”34 Thus, when faced with these decisions, there is
an intricate interplay of divergent considerations between (A) recognition of
intellectual property rights and (B) protection of constitutional freedoms of speech
and religion under the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution.35 These two bodies
of legal doctrine are discussed in the following subsections.
A. There Should Be a Presumption Because Most Religious Names Are Generic
The inadequacy of the current U.S. legal framework is especially apparent in
determining whether religious organizations have intellectual property rights in
31 Heneghan, supra note 2 (using an example of several Protestant churches opposing the
Vatican’s application for the exclusive use of <.catholic> because those churches use the term to
mean “universal”).
32 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 469, 504.
33 Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA of Charleston, 335 F. Supp. 615, 625 (D.S.C. 1971).
34 See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off!
Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1843 (1998).
35 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 468.
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their names. Because of the issues presented by the First Amendment, the legal
framework crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court is one of “judicial restraint” in
resolving disputes as to church property generally.36 Under Supreme Court
precedent, if no clear decision by the polity is apparent, courts must apply neutral
principles of intellectual property law.37
Underlying the objective to further robust competition is the ultimate goal of
trademark law—to protect “brands” that serve as source identifiers.38
For
consumers, being assured that a product or service comes from a particular source
and has the qualities that consumers desire reduces consumer search costs and
provides assurance of authenticity, whether because a consumer has used the
product or service before, or because a brand from a particular source has a positive
reputation within the marketplace.39
1. Neutral Principles of Genericism
Generic marks “refe[r] to the genus of which the particular product is a
species.”40 In applying neutral principles of trademark law to church names, “most
religious organizations’ names consist of generic words with the confusion stemming
from similarly-named organizations.”41 Genericism exists if the “church name
contain[s] words that are common words merely describing a set of beliefs” and do
not provide an indication of source.42 As a general matter, generic words and phrases
receive no trademark protection, as they would not further the underlying goals of
trademark law, which is to facilitate healthy competition and to assist consumers in
identifying particular brands.43
Notwithstanding, it is possible that, “[e]ven if the words [within a] name are
individually generic, the composite name may not be generic if it indicates a source
producer, such as the sect behind a generic church name.”44 Under trademark law,

Id. at 470; Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1844.
Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1881; see also Sirico, Jr., supra note 15, at 335 (“The free
exercise clause requires a court to resolve the matter without ruling on any religious controversy
that lies at the heart of the dispute.”); Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1844. Intra-church disputes
present two alternative approaches to the courts—one of “polity-deference” or of “neutral principles.”
Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1844. As the names connote, courts must choose between (i) deferring
to the decision of the group or church as determined according to its own procedure for decisionmaking or (ii) applying neutral and secular principles of law. Id.
38 David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith:
Trademarks, Religion and
Identity, 49 IDEA 233, 235 (2009) (“Indeed, the goal of trademark law is to provide legal protection
for names and symbols that represent a source.”).
39 See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(2004).
40 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (2002) (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
41 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 469.
42 Id. at 511.
43 Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871).
44 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 505.
36
37
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this concept is commonly referred to as “secondary meaning.45 A generic religious
name or phrase may acquire secondary meaning if “the primary significance of the
[generic] term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product[’s name] but
the producer.”46 Thus, in the context of religious names, the primary significance of
the term in the minds of the public must be a particular religious unit or
organization and not the belief system itself in order to acquire secondary meaning.47
In making this determination, it is the minds of the “relevant public” that matter.48
Whether the “relevant public” is the broad general public, a less broad “purchasing
public,” or another even narrower segment of the public at large is a question for
each court to determine on a case-by-case basis.49
It is conceivable that, within this intellectual property framework, “a church
name over time can take on the connotation of a specific sect affiliation” that is the
sole producer of a certain belief system.50 However, I postulate that, if secular
trademark principles are properly applied as they ordinarily would be in a nonreligious commercial context, it will be infrequent that a religious word or phrase
sought to be used by others will primarily signify a single source. Based upon this
notion, the imposition of a per se rule establishing a presumption in favor of
genericism will merely mirror the realities of the context in which these religious
names are actually used such that attempts to seek monopolies of generic religious
names through courts will be appropriately diminished.
2. Religious Organizations as an Indicator of Source
A local, regional or worldwide public association with a single source institution
is rarely the case in the religious context. Indeed, it is not the conscious and natural
objective of promoters of religious belief systems to claim to be the source at all.
Religions spread across continents and, at a doctrinal level, do not derive from an
Earthly source. Often the parties freely admit that a heavenly message (i.e. the
“product or service” in trademark jargon) derives from a divine source, and is
purposefully disseminated through various affiliated and unaffiliated institutions
and organizations. Thus, how can the name of a religious belief come from one
mortal individual or entity that is capable of having scribed one’s name on a
trademark registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”)? If a religious name is recognized as a trademark, and a trademark is a
property right, then this property must have a specific owner. In the cases of
secondary meaning, this singular owner must likewise be the solitary supplier of a

45 Id.; Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (indicating that secondary meaning is also known as
“acquired distinctiveness.”).
46 Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 298 (D.N.J. 1998).
47 Id.
48 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
49 James Lockhart, When Does Product Become Generic Term So As To Warrant Cancellation of
Registration of Mark, Pursuant to § 14 of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1064), 156 A.L.R. FED. 131,
*8(a)−8(b) (1999).
50 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 505.
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religious “brand” sufficient to monopolize what would ordinarily be a common generic
name.
Many churches admit and make clear that the “relevant public” for their
religious message is everyone in the world. For example, the Southern Baptist
Convention’s explicit mission statement is, “[a]s a convention of churches . . . to
present the Gospel of Jesus Christ to every person in the world and to make disciples
of all the nations.”51 Therefore, when courts determine the primary significance of a
church name or phrase to the relevant consuming public, this “poses a question of
fact in each case, and the trier of fact has the formidable task of ascertaining on the
evidence submitted the meaning of the word among an indeterminable number of
persons, perhaps millions.”52 The Southern Baptist Convention’s mission statement
suggests that the number of members of the relevant public will most often be in the
millions, if not billions.53 As a result, neutral principles of genericness and secondary
meaning are difficult, if not impossible, for courts to properly apply to religious
names used throughout the world.54 Adoption of a per se presumption that religious
names are generic and do not acquire secondary meaning without “clear and
convincing” evidence that the primary significance to the relevant public is that of a
certain source producer will bring religious trade names back within the intent and
underlying objectives of trademark law as a legal doctrine. This will also prevent
generic names of belief systems or of a certain individual believer from
monopolization by one incorporated or unincorporated association.
3. There Is Already a Movement in the Courts Toward Generic Per Se
Should we provide one person or artificial entity a trademark in the name of a
religious faith and remove it from the public domain? Many courts have already
answered this question in the negative, finding that religious names are per se
generic.55 The New York Court of Appeals in The New Thought Church v. Chapin
stated that religious names simply convey to the relevant public:
[F]irst, the system of religion which it teaches, and, second, that it teaches
that system through the medium of organizations known as churches. It
surely is not in a position to successfully claim a monopoly of teaching this

51 Mission & Vision, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/missionvision.asp (last
visited May 24, 2013).
52 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.02[7] (2012).
53 Mission & Vision, supra note 51 (seeking to “present the Gospel of Jesus Christ to every
person in the world”).
54 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 511.
55 See, e.g., Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 520 A.2d
1347, 1352 (N.J. 1987) (“Plaintiffs simply cannot appropriate, from the public domain, the common
name of a religion and somehow gain an exclusive right to its use and the right to prevent others
from using it.”); The New Thought Church v. Chapin, 144 N.Y.S. 1026, 1027–28 (N.Y. App. Div.
1913).

[12:697 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

708

form of religious faith by means of organizations known by the generic
names of churches.56
Courts have determined that this is true even if there is a point in time when
only one institution is using a particular religious name and may claim to be a
single source.57
4. Have Other Courts Been Analytically Honest and True to the Justifications for
Trademark Protections?
At times, courts find that trademark rights exist in a religious name.58
According to the legal framework discussed above, such a finding legally concludes
that the plaintiff established that the religious name at issue is associated by the
“relevant public” with the plaintiff as a single source of a particular religious belief
system.59 By means of example, one such case is the General Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, where at issue was a break-away church’s use of
“Seventh-day Adventist” in its church name.60 The General Conference had
registered SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST and ADVENTIST with the PTO.61 McGill,
originally a member of a Seventh Day Adventist church affiliated with the General
Conference, decided to separate from the church because of a theological dispute.62
Because McGill believed he was “divinely required” to use the name “Seventh Day
56 See The New Thought Church, 144 N.Y.S. at 1028; see also Silversmith & Guggenheim,
supra note 16, at 514 (“The plaintiffs have no right to a monopoly of the name of a religion. The
defendants, who purport to be members of the same religion, have an equal right to use the name of
the religion in connection with their own meetings, lectures, classes and other activities.”); Christian
Science Bd. of Dirs., 520 A.2d at 1352 (“Plaintiffs simply cannot appropriate, from the public
domain, the common name of a religion and somehow gain an exclusive right to its use and the right
to prevent others from using it.”).
57 See, e.g., Christian Science Bd. of Dirs., 520 A.2d at 1352–53.

[T]he absence of other groups using the name of a religion in the names of their
churches does not render the right to use of the name the exclusive property of
[the mother church]. Exclusive use “cannot take the common descriptive [i.e.,
generic] name of an article out of the public domain and give the temporarily
exclusive user of it exclusive rights to it, no matter how much money or effort it
pours into promoting the sale of the merchandise.”
Id. at 1353 (quoting J. Kohnstram Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A.
1960)).
58 See, e.g., Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 405 (6th Cir.
2010) (recognizing registration of the “Seventh-day Adventist” mark); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993
F. Supp. 282, 313 (D.N.J. 1998) (issuing an injunction against defendant and finding trademark
rights existed in “Jews for Jesus” and found against a critic of Jews for Jesus seeking registration of
“<jewsforjesus.org>” and “<jews-for-jesus.com>”); Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 983–84 (4th
Cir. 1944) (holding that “Methodist Episcopal Church” had exclusive rights to use the name).
59 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
60 Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 404 (6th Cir. 2010).
61 Id. at 405.
62 Id.
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Adventist” in his new church’s name, he did so, naming his church “A Creation
Seventh Day & Adventist Church.”63 McGill also purchased Internet domain names
for, among others, <7th-day-adventist.org>, <creation-7th-dayadventist-church.org>,
and <creationseventhday-adventistchurch.org>.64 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held against McGill, finding that the General Conference has
trademark rights in the name “Seventh-day Adventist” and that McGill’s use was
infringing.65 Thus, based upon court precedent in McGill, the General Conference
has national, court-approved, exclusive trademark rights to the name “Seventh-day
Adventist” or any name which is confusingly similar, including one used in a domain
name.66
Hence, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in McGill begs some questions. Did the Sixth
Circuit properly apply neutral principles of trademark law in McGill? Did the court
further any of the theoretical objectives of trademark law in finding for the General
Conference? Customer surveys are often used in trademark cases to gauge whether a
proffered trademark has acquired secondary meaning. 67 If one hundred members of
the “relevant public” were questioned as to the primary significance of the term
“Seventh-day Adventist,” how many would state that it identified the name of a
particular “brand” of the Protestant religion produced by the General Conference?
Without commissioning a survey, it seems unlikely that the majority of those
questioned would state that it was the name of the particular religion itself. In fact,
even if one hundred members of the Seventh-day Adventist church were asked as to
the name of their religion, what would they call it? It seems likely that the majority
would say “Seventh-day Adventist” and that they were “Seventh-day Adventists.”
The type of monopoly provided to the General Conference in McGill seems to be
just the type that black-letter trademark law tries to prohibit.68 If a theoretical
justification of trademark law is to foster competition, how is anyone supposed to
compete with the General Conference to provide an alternative to its “brand” of the
Protestant religion? If McGill cannot use the words “Seventh-day Adventist” in the
name of his new church, then what is he supposed to call it so that people will readily
identify the particular belief system he believes in and which he is seeking to
promote to others? McGill’s doctrinal dispute with the General Conference should
not require him to create an entirely new name for his religious beliefs.
Moreover, if a “Seventh-day Adventist” is seeking a new congregation, perhaps
one that promotes McGill’s religious interpretation, does the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in McGill further the primary objective of trademark law to provide consumers with
a clear indication of source and reduce consumer search costs? If McGill cannot use
the name “Seventh-day Adventist” in the name of his new church, then it seems that
it will be difficult for those looking for a like-minded church to find the type of
“product” they are seeking. In the context of domain names and Internet search
engines, if not “Seventh-day Adventist,” then what is a potential member of the
Id.
Id. at 405–06.
65 Id. at 416.
66 Id.
67 See Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 249 (5th Cir. 2010).
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
63
64
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congregation supposed to type into his or her browser? This deprivation of use rights
seems especially onerous in a modern age of Internet search optimization.
McGill and others similarly situated could certainly choose another name.
However, a “personality” approach to intellectual property theorizes that they should
not have to. The personality theory of property puts forward that property should be
owned by those who most personally identify with it.69 This principle particularly
embodies the underlying justifications for copyright law and patent law by protecting
authors and inventors who personally identify with the fruits of their ideas and of
their labor as extensions of themselves on an emotional and intimate level. In the
context of religious names, certainly these are deeply personal to righteous believers.
Undoubtedly, McGill’s fervent self-identification as a “Seventh-day Adventist” fueled
his pursuit of an ability to call himself one. Thus, perhaps there is a personality
approach within the underpinnings of a constitutional right to freedom of religion
itself, and such an approach toward ownership of religious names supports a
presumption in favor of societal ownership by a collective of individual believers.
5. Will a Presumption Discriminate Against Religious Entities in Pursuit of
Commercial Endeavors Which Need Trademarks to Build Revenues?
It is proffered that a per se presumption against trademark protection will
reduce the frequency of cases involving religious names as trademarks and lessen the
number of cases where freedoms of religion and speech hang in the balance. In the
event that such a presumption is codified, undoubtedly many will criticize the
limitation as infringing upon the rights of religious organizations to acquire and
benefit from trademark rights as a commercial business necessity. Of course, nonprofit ventures unrelated to religious aims may acquire intellectual property rights.
However, I submit that churches and other religious organizations will not receive
disparate treatment from secular non-profits and will merely be playing by the same
rules as any other enterprise, whether not-for-profit or commercial.
In the corporate world, marketing departments are on constant guard of
selecting generic or descriptive names for products and services in fear that such
names will not be protectable vis-à-vis competitors or will not be able to garner a
registration through the PTO. As discussed above, an intellectually evenhanded
analysis of these religious names would not meet the requisite level for trademark
protection in most cases.70 If, indeed, a religious word does meet the threshold
through clear and convincing evidence that the primary significance of the word
mark is that of a source producer, then churches certainly may possess trademark
rights just as any other commercial actor. However, only then will the providing of a
monopoly on a particular religious word or phrase fulfill the theoretical objectives of
trademark law on a fundamental level.

See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 982 (1982).
See, e.g., The New Thought Church v. Chapin, 159 A.D. 723, 725 (1913) (finding the name
“The New Thought Church" to be generic and indistinct).
69
70
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B. There Should Be a Presumption Because Monopolization Violates Constitutional
Freedoms
In reviewing U.S. jurisprudence in the area as a whole, it seems difficult to
discern a clear body of black-letter law that is consistently applied by U.S. courts in
disputes regarding religious names as trademarks.71
Simply put, courts
inconsistently analyze and decide these cases, and such is not purely the product of
jurists’ imprudence.72 Perhaps, instead of consciously abandoning underlying
justifications and black-letter law of trademarks altogether, it is more likely that
constitutional constraints and the limited availability of analytical frameworks cause
courts to reach certain ownership determinations in cases of religious names and the
volatility of the resulting body of case law is the result of a complex interplay of
constitutional and property interests.73 Indeed, a “senior” organization taking
priority over a name as a trademark impedes another’s future religious freedoms.
Moreover, these cases often involve the parties’ request that the court determine
which among them is the “true faith,” which courts cannot constitutionally
adjudicate.74
Specifically, with respect to trademark rights, when a court grants to one party
a monopoly on the name of a church or a phrase associated with one religion or
another, it simultaneously orders that others desist from using the name or phrase.75
Because the trade name may be a “religious touchstone for another individual,” this
acknowledgement of property protection may impede the ability of individuals to
freely exercise religion without government interference.76 Thus, a court decision as
to ownership and infringement of a trade name may run afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. At the same time, the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment may be at odds with such a court determination since this
government action may establish the prevailing party’s religion ahead of another

71

See Sirico, Jr., supra note 15, at 335–37. Professor Sirico explains that:
In 1979, the Supreme Court made clear that courts have at their disposal more
than one method for resolving [church property dispute] cases. Since then,
supreme courts and appellate courts in at least twenty-five states have published
opinions in which they either have reaffirmed their traditional methods for
resolving church property disputes or have adopted new methods. Most courts
have failed to give a detailed justification for choosing one approach over another.
I believe that this failure has occurred because the available methods are
intellectually unsatisfactory. Each test requires assuming that a church fits an
organizational stereotype that may or may not be accurate.

Id. at 335–37.
72 Compare The New Thought Church, 159 A.D. at 724–25 (holding the name “The New
Thought Church” to be generic and incapable of trademark protection), with McGill, 617 F.3d at 416
(holding that “Seventh Day Adventist” was not generic and was capable of trademark protection).
73 See Sirico, Jr., supra note 15, at 337.
74 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 475–76; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 707–08 (1871).
75 See, e.g., McGill, 617 F.3d at 407.
76 Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 468.
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practitioner seeking to worship the religion in his or her own way.77 Lastly,
providing an intellectual property monopoly to one religious institution for exclusive
use may unconstitutionally restrict another’s ability to utilize the name or phrase,
not to worship, but to speak out against certain religious tenets or policies, in
violation of a U.S. citizen’s inalienable right to freedom of speech.
1. Neither of the Tests Available to Courts Are Sufficient
Notwithstanding the theoretical objectives of the “polity-deference” or “neutral
principles” approaches—the two alternative tests available at present—often neither
is viable in practice. In terms of deference to church decision-making authority, what
if the parties disagree as to who or what the decision-making body is? Moreover,
what if church tenets connote that the ultimate decider is God, Allah, Adonai or
Buddah, and that all direction comes above? Reality suggests that not all churches
have a clear hierarchy like the Catholic Church with an edict promulgated from God
via the Vatican. A court determination, even as to the mere existence of a hierarchy,
may run afoul of the First Amendment in itself.78 In addition, some churches like the
Baptist Church have a congregational polity based upon democratic principles
employed among church members.79 This makes it almost impossible for courts to
pinpoint a “church decision” on the matter, much less defer to it, because it is likely
that the parties’ positions will be at odds if they are in litigation against one another
in the first place and have been unable to resolve the matter out of court. The parties
may not even agree on the mere identity of the “true church” on a fundamental level
if one sect has broken off from another.80
Further, the alternative approach of “neutral principles” likewise presents
difficult questions for courts as to how these neutral and secular principles of law
should be applied within a church setting where church members may not think or
act as they reasonably would in a commercial one.81 General principles of
commercial law may be inapplicable and incongruent due to parties’ reasonable
expectations or prior normal courses of dealing as church members.82 Indeed, what
may be reasonable in a commercial context may be unreasonable under the specter of
religious doctrine, and vice versa.
2. Are Courts Reluctant to Shift the Status Quo?
At first blush, it may seem as if courts are simply averse to adjudicate these
types of cases at all, at least by means of rendering a decision that changes the
parties’ positions. Hugh C. Hansen, Director of the Intellectual Property Law
See id. at 471–72.
Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1877–82.
79 Id. at 1864 (“Under the polity approach, if a church organization is congregational, courts
assume that it governs itself like an ordinary voluntary association.”).
80 Id. at 1843–44.
81 See, e.g., Sirico, Jr., supra note 15, at 356.
82 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1885–86.
77
78
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Institute and Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law, has suggested
that court decisions regarding disputes over church names can be largely reconciled
simply by recognizing that courts desire to maintain the status quo in these cases in
an effort to avoid involvement in doctrinal disputes.83 Professor Hansen opines that,
in order to maintain matters as they existed prior to commencement of the action, so
that the court cannot be accused of taking government action that changed the
parties’ positions, courts usually decide against the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is
the senior user (i.e. the “mother” church) or the junior user (i.e. the “break-away”
church).84 Therefore, in the case of break-away members from a parent church, if the
parent files suit seeking to stop the break-away members from using a name, the
court finds that the church name is generic and the break-away members prevail.
Alternatively, if the break-away members seek a declaratory judgment from a court
to affirm its lawful use of the church name, the court finds that the name is not
generic, the declaratory judgment is denied, and the parent church prevails.
Perhaps, like McGill, not all cases fit perfectly into Professor Hansen’s proffered
rubric. Nonetheless, it seems to be a reasonable and pragmatic approach for courts
to employ given the constitutional dangers and impracticalities implicit in the
“polity-deference” and “neutral principles” alternatives. At present, courts are placed
in an untenable position. Neither of the alternatives permitted by the Supreme
Court are satisfactory in the context of religious trade names, and a per se
presumption will focus courts to a narrow issue in applying neutral principles of
whether a religious name or phrase has acquired the requisite secondary meaning
when the traditional test is objectively applied.85
3. The Law Should Err in Favor of Individual Religious Autonomy
Despite the constitutional difficulties in deciding these cases, courts must
nevertheless render a decision one way or another when these disputes come to bar.
Courts do not possess an ostrich-like luxury to bury its proverbial head in the sand.
A decision either way can be argued as having the effect of infringing upon freedom
of religion, and simultaneously, as upholding religious freedoms. It is with this
reality in mind that the proposed presumption against protection of religious names
is tendered. Why choose constitutional freedoms of individuals to practice free
religion over other constitutional and commercial considerations in tension with
same, such as a religious organization’s constitutional ability to engage in commerce
and acquire property through trademarks? I submit that preservation of religious
protections for the less-authoritative minority should take precedent.
Break-away churches are often smaller, less powerful and less established than
the mother church. A presumed exception would protect the interests of
disadvantaged minority groups who will not have established priority rights in a
particular religious name, but yet have a genuine constitutional interest in its use.
83 Professor Hugh C. Hansen, Oral Lecture at Fordham Law School (Oct. 17, 2012) (cited with
speaker’s written permission).
84 Id.
85 Greenawalt, supra note 34, at 1905–06; Sirico Jr., supra note 15, at 337.
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Conversely, without a presumed exception, a mother church with senior use would be
able to eliminate competing voices of minority groups within a particular religious
sect. This type of discrimination is enabled by a trademark monopoly.
In fact, § 110 of the U.S. Copyright Act already includes an exception whereby a
“performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-musical
work of a religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of
worship or other religious assembly” does not receive copyright protection.86
Excepting religious services from copyright law preserves a right to worship. A
similar exception in trademark law for religious words and phrases will further a
similar objective toward religious freedom.
Furthermore, the United States, unlike other countries, recognizes any genuine
religion as legitimate, even if it only has one practitioner. Indeed, “religious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection.”87 With this in mind, courts have often
prioritized freedom of religion over business necessity to ensure reasonable
accommodation of religious freedoms, even above significant bona fide commercial
interests.88 In fact, I premise that such a priority is necessary to sustain religious
freedoms at all. Otherwise, a powerful commercial world may soon swallow
individual religious voices whole.
III. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION OUTSIDE OF U.S. COURTS AND THE
AFOREMENTIONED FRAMEWORK
As discussed above, disputes as to alleged trademarks within domain names
may be brought in court subject to the aforementioned imperfect judicial framework.
Alternatively, the party with the power of forum selection may elect, instead, to bring
a claim through the UDRP.89 Importantly, the UDRP has a different legal standard
to be applied to allegations of trademark infringement within domain names, 90 and
because of this, it is ill-equipment to resolve disputes involving bona fide uses of
religious names within URLs.
Upon purchasing a domain name from an ICANN-accredited registry, the
purchaser is required to consent to dispute resolution through the UDRP.91 In terms
of the overall process, the UDRP is similar to that of the American Arbitration
17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
88 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 (1977).
89 See WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/#a2 (last visited May 24, 2013).
90 Id.
91 How Does the UDRP Work?, Response to Frequently Asked Questions: Internet Domain
Names, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/faq/domains.html#8 (last
visited May 24, 2013). As a condition to becoming accredited as a registry by ICANN, ICANN
mandates that each registry contractually agree to impose UDRP provisions within each of its
individual contracts with URL purchasers. ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement, § 3.8,
ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/raa/ra-agreement-21may09-en.htm
(last
visited May 24, 2013). Thus, as a practical matter, every URL occupant has consented to UDRP
jurisdiction and resolution of domain name disputes through the UDRP.
86
87
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Association, and many other popular avenues for alternative dispute resolution. 92
However, WIPO’s UDRP activities are isolated only to resolution of domain name
disputes.93 The UDRP has its own set of rules distinct from national trademark laws,
including specific frameworks to determine whether a complainant is entitled to
relief. Specifically, paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP Rules (the “Rules”) requires that the
complainant prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a
domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by
the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; (2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate
interest in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.94 Apparent in this UDRP legal standard, the UDRP is
intended to resolve instances of clear cybersquatting, rather than bona fide uses of
another’s alleged trademark.95
Thus, in comparison to U.S. common law
jurisprudence, the UDRP framework is much more lenient to the respondent than for
a defendant in a court lawsuit under U.S. trademark infringement standards. As a
consequence, the UDRP is unsuited for resolution of trademark infringement
disputes when a subsequent user of a mark either (i) has a legitimate interest in
doing so or (ii) is using another’s asserted mark within a domain name in good
faith.96 In short, under the UDRP, proof of mere “likelihood of confusion” is not
92 Compare source cited supra note 89 (providing that the UDRP’s five basic stages are the
filing of the complaint, the filing of the response, the appointment of a dispute resolution service
provider, the issuance of a decision, and the implementation of that decision), with Arbitration, AM.
ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/arbitration?_afrLoop
=471206020521674&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=1a3odniana_6#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3
D1a3odniana_6%26_afrLoop%3D471206020521674%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%
3D1a3odniana_18 (last visited May 24, 2013) (listing that the American Arbitration Association’s
stages for arbitration are filing and initiation, arbitrator selection, preliminary hearing, information
exchange and preparation, hearings, post-hearing submissions, and the award).
93 What is the UDRP?
Response to Frequently Asked Questions: Internet Domain Names,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/faq/domains.html#16 (last visited
May 24, 2013) (indicating that the UDRP focuses only on conflicts between trademarks and domain
names).
94 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ¶ 4(a), ICANN (Aug. 26, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy; see also The Coca Cola Company v. The Holy See,
Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA0304000155454 (July 3, 2003) (Samuels, Arb.).
95 Nicholas Smith & Erik Wilbers, The UDRP:
Design Elements of an Effective ADR
Mechanism, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215, 221 (2004).
96 See What Types of Disputes Are Covered by the UDRP Administrative Procedure?, FAQ for
WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/index.html#a3 (last visited May 24, 2013). The
UDRP is only available for disputes that meet the following criteria:

(i) the domain name registered by the domain name registrant is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant (the
person or entity bringing the complaint) has rights; and
(ii) the domain name registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of
the domain name in question; and
(iii) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
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enough for a claimant to prevail.97 Thus, claimants asserting trademark rights in
religious names used within URLs would be remiss to bring claims against good faith
users within the UDRP.
As a result, although UDRP claims must be resolved by the UDRP arbitration
panel within fourteen days of their appointment, and thus, is often the most cost and
time efficient means of resolving domain name disputes, this abbreviated type of
proceeding will not be available for McGill-type cases. Because alleged infringers
will have sought and obtained a domain name based upon a bona fide religious basis
to do so, disputes as to these religious names in the new TLDs will be incapable of
resolution within the UDRP dispute resolution process. Instead, these disputes will
be timely and more costly, and will require resolution within courts. Courts may
then be confronted with a flooded caseload of disputes over an expanded set of
religious domain names, and they must resolve these cases within the existing
methodology. Not only may courts struggle to do justice within this inadequate
framework, in the event that it finds that trademark rights exist through a
conjectural analysis of neutral principles, it may likely trample upon constitutional
rights in the process and, in doing so, remove descriptors of common religious belief
systems from the public domain.
This is not all. In restricting all but one’s use of a particular religious name or
phrase, courts will simultaneously be thwarting the objectives of TLD name
expansion altogether for religious organizations. It seems to be incredibly inefficient
to force TLD owners and registries to leave infinite “placeholders” for one particular
intellectual property right-holder, or else, face imminent suit. Thus, I submit that
the current religious trademark monopoly defies common sense moving forward in a
modern world of infinite TLDs. Therefore, a presumption within the U.S. court
system may serve to alleviate problems presented by TLD expansion in the current
status quo when courts, not the UDRP, are faced with resolution of these disputes.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A PRESUMPTION THAT RELIGIOUS WORDS ARE GENERIC AND
NOT PROTECTED BY TRADEMARK
The law creates presumptions in the interest of societal good in order to produce
a probability of outcomes that promotes fairness and sound public policy.98 For
example, within U.S. trademark law, there currently exists a presumption against
trademark protection of surnames.99 If a proposed trademark is “primarily merely a
surname,” then it is not capable of obtaining trademark rights unless a petitioner can
present evidence of long and exclusive use that changes its significance to the public
from that of a surname of an individual to that of a mark for a particular source

Id.
Id.
Fed. R. Evid. 301 advisory committee’s note (“The same considerations of fairness, policy,
and probability which dictate the allocation of the burden of the various elements of a case as
between the prima facie case of a plaintiff and affirmative defenses also underlie the creation of
presumptions.”).
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2012).
97
98
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goods or services (i.e. secondary meaning).100 Public policy behind such a presumed
exception keeps surnames available for people who wish to use their own surnames
in their businesses, and not allow one person coming before them to monopolize
another’s own name.101 Such an exception is presumed so long as the consuming
public will not be confused due to a secondary meaning acquired by the name.102 The
presumption against trademark protection of religious names, as proposed in this
Article, follows this same model.
A. Proposed Procedural Rules
To be clear, this Article does not propose that the law absolutely prohibit the
protection of religious names as trademarks. Under the proposed framework, it is
possible for religious names to garner protection. However, like surnames, a higher
threshold for protection is necessary.
The following procedural mechanics are proposed: Regardless of whether or not
a PTO registration exists, a party asserting trademark rights in a word or phrase
that is “primarily merely a religious name” will have the burden to prove through
“clear and convincing evidence” that the name has acquired secondary meaning—
that the primary significance of the religious name in the minds of the relevant
consuming public is not merely a religion or a religious belief system, but is instead a
particular religious unit or organization that is an indication of source.103 Whether
or not a particular word or phrase is “primarily merely a religious name” will depend
upon the court’s evaluation of the word or phrase on a case-by-case basis, but should
include consideration of the following two factors: (i) the frequency and geographic
scope of use of the designation as the name of a religion or belief system; and (ii) the
extent to which the designation has a recognized meaning as something other than
the name of a religion or belief system. So as to avoid circumventing a trier of fact’s
determination as to whether the designation has acquired secondary meaning, in
determining whether the designation is “primarily merely religious name,” a court
should construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
proponent is seeking to enforce trademark rights. With regard to the proponent’s
burden of proof, “clear and convincing” evidence shall be found to exist when the
proponent places in the mind of the ultimate fact finder that the proponent’s factual
contentions are “highly probably true.”104 A “clear and convincing” standard of proof
See Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
Nat’l Cigar Stands Co. v. Frishmuth Bro. & Co., 297 F. 348, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“A person
may put his own name upon his own goods, notwithstanding another person of the same name may,
in that name, manufacture and sell the same or similar articles.”) (quoting Columbia Mill Co. v.
Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 466 (1883)).
102 Id. at 349–50.
103 Cf. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 298–99 (D.N.J. 1998).
The standard
suggested in this Article mirrors the standard promulgated in Jews for Jesus. Id.
104 See Har v. Boreiko, 986 A.2d 1072, 1080 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). One court described the
“clear and convincing” standard as:
100
101

[A] degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or
existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is
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is appropriate here, as the Supreme Court has previously applied the same standard
in other cases which, like freedom of religion, involve important liberty interests.105
B. The Proposal Will Comport with International Norms
Especially with regard to new TLD name extensions, it is important to keep in
mind that these will have international reach on the Internet. If ICANN selects
AGITSys, the private Turkish IT company that has submitted a bid for the <.islam>
TLD, it will be able to control which Islamic voices are capable of being heard via the
TLD. Perhaps this is why Saudi Arabia has opposed AGITSys’ selection, as well as
all other religious TLD issuances by ICANN.106 Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of
Islam, clearly has an interest in the preservation of its own religious heritage and
sovereign autonomy. Others within the international community may also have
similar important interests to safeguard against religious control.
In fact, to avoid trademark monopolization of religious designations, members of
the international community have already determined that religious names and
symbols should be treated differently with respect to trademarks. In Israel, “a mark
identical with or similar to emblems of exclusively religious significance” is incapable
of federal registration.107 Moreover, in Hungary, “[a] sign shall be excluded from
trade mark protection if . . . it consists exclusively of symbols having a close relation
to religious or other beliefs.”108
CONCLUSION
Technology has previously compelled change within the law, and it will continue
to do so. There was a time when the keystone of real property law was that land is
protected by trespass law all the way down below and to an indefinite extent
upward.109 However, the expansion of technology, such as the invention and
required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if
evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts
asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist
is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.
Id.

See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a person
should be involuntarily committed for an indefinite period of time to a State hospital); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that “the State support its allegations” by clear and convincing evidence before it “may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child”).
106 See Heneghan, supra note 2.
107 Trade Marks Ordinance (New Version), 5732-1972, 26 LSI 511, art. 11(7) (Isr), available in
English at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128044.
108 1997. évi XI. törvény a védjegyek és a földrajzi árujelzők oltalmáról (Act XI of 1997 on the
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications, art. 3(2)(c)) (Hung.)
109 See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), LONANG,
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-202.htm (last visited May 24, 2013).
105
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widespread prevalence of airplanes, made it necessary to craft new law, as the
“indefinite extent upward” concept defied common sense in contemporary times and
would expose every airplane flight operator to “countless trespass suits.”110 Although
admittedly not as technologically pioneering as aviation, the impact of ICANN’s
release of new TLDs places the protection of religious trademarks at a precipice.
Once a religious TLD is awarded, a generic religious name should not also be
monopolized elsewhere in cyberspace or in the physical world.
We should rethink how we apply the law to cases involving religious trade
names. A presumption against trademark protection may indeed reduce the number
of religious trademark cases brought forward to courts, limiting those cases that do
come to bar to those with convincing claims of secondary meaning. In addition to
bolstering the integrity of a neutral principles trademark analysis, minimizing
monopolies on generic religious names will correspondingly reaffirm a commitment to
preservation of constitutional freedoms.

110

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946).

